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AbsTrAcT This article discusses the problem of betweenness that Tetsurō Watsuji describes
in his book Ethics. There, he takes up the very special theme of the two-person community,
which seems to be a kind of solipsism-space constituted by two persons closely related to
each other. But this contains the possibility, for Watsuji, to develop an examination of the in-
tensive space known as MA, which is not only a subject matter of comparative cultural studies,
but also of philosophy.
KEYWOrDs Testurō Watsuji; Betweenness; Kyoto School; Two-person community
rÉsUMÉ Cet article traite le problème de l’entre que Tetsurō Watsuji a exploré dans son
livre intitulé L’Éthique. Il y approfondit le thème très particulier de la communauté de deux-
personnes, qui semble tenir en un espace-solipsisme constitué par deux personnes très
intimes. Mais cela ouvre la possibilité, pour Watsuji, d’explorer plus profondément l’espace
d’intensité nommé MA, qui intéresse beaucoup de notions non seulement culturelles mais
vraiment philosophiques.
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Introduction
Testurō Watsuji (1886–1969) is a Japanese ethical theorist famous for his Climate and
Culture: A Philosophical Study (1935) and Ethics as the Study of Man (1934). He was pro-
fessor of ethics at Kyoto University, where he joined Kitarō Nishida, the founder of
modern philosophy in Japan, and he was afﬁliated with the Kyoto school of philosophy,
but later on he moved to Tokyo Imperial University. A characteristic of his theory is
that he approaches the nature of space and betweenness from a particularly Japanese
perspective. His thoughts on space can be read as a peculiar kind of criticism of trends
of thought in modern Europe.
His Culture and Climate, which was highly praised by Augustin berque, and which
has become world-famous through its translation into Western languages, begins with
a critique of Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962), which will be discussed later. Here,
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Watsuji emphasizes the essentiality of the spatial dimension in human existence, in
contrast with Heidegger’s prioritizing of temporality. In his Ethics as the Study of Man,
Watsuji takes up the formation of the Japanese word for human and states that human
existence is itself an existence of betweenness or relationship (the Japanese character
for human being, ningen, literally means between persons). For Watsuji, space is be-
tweenness, and betweenness is an important aspect of existence itself. The self does
not exist as a metaphysical self in the Western sense, grounded on the structure of the
self-affection of time, but ﬁrst and foremost within space. It is not the individual that
exists ﬁrst, but rather the relationship. Watsuji’s thought can thus be understood as a
precursor of a theme often discussed in the twentieth century, namely the priority of
relations over substantive individuals.
but if this were all, then it would seem that Watsuji has simply planted relational
ideas, characteristic of the twentieth century, into a non-Western soil. Watsuji’s thought
on betweenness, however, possesses a uniqueness that is not conﬁned to this kind of
relationism. A text that displays this vividly—and in some sense even grotesquely—
is Ethics (1937–1949), a book intended as a systematic presentation of his philosophy.
In a section of this work Watsuji discusses what he calls a two-person community, a
married couple or closely associated partners. Watsuji’s ideas are on the whole rather
moderate, but his discussion of the two-person community displays in a vivid way the
radical gist of his philosophy.
Normally, we formulate a relationship between two persons as You and I, but for
Watsuji, the I is from the beginning nothing but a privation of the relationship with
the other. In the case where the other is a multiplicity or a society, the self would be
deﬁned as nothing but a relationship. but in the case where the other is a singular in-
dividual, then that individual would also be nothing but a relational being. Here, it is
inevitable that the space of the You and the I seems to be closed off in a peculiar way,
but at the same time is in fact structured in such a way that it is nowhere closed off.
This is because although the space is a betweenness, it lacks the You and the I—it is a
Nothingness of betweenness, something like a zero-point of betweenness.
This article presents Watsuji’s theory of betweenness, focusing on his discussion
of the two-person community.
Watsuji’s two-person community
Watsuji discusses the “two-person community” in chapter 3, section 2 of Ethics, under
the topic of “family.” As is apparent from the section’s subtitle, “sexual Love and
Married couples,” Watsuji deals with the family form of married couples. However,
his conception of “two-person-ness” in this section is very strange. This is because
Watsuji argues that, as partners, a married couple should keep no secrets from each
other, revealing themselves openly, but with respect to other members of the family
such as their parents and siblings, as well as the local community, while forming a self-
contained and hidden space.
With a few exceptions, Watsuji does not take up his unique ideas on two-person-
ness until this section, and even here his discussion of Ethics seems to be nothing but
a stepping stone for the development of his theory of community from the family to
the state; furthermore, Watsuji himself does not develop his ideas on two-person-ness
in much detail. Again, it is possible to read this section as the espousal of an old-fash-
ioned feudal ethics regarding chastity after marriage. However, Watsuji’s discussion of
the two-person community has many important implications reﬂecting his overall
philosophy.
First, let us consider the place of this discussion within Watsuji’s thought. It bears
repeating that an important concept for Watsuji is the concept of “relationship.” by
“relationship,” he is referring to a kind of spatiality that involves differences and their
dynamic tensions, but at the same time makes such differences possible. but what
does it mean to emphasize this kind of “relationship”?
The answer to this question is a simple one. The purpose of emphasizing “rela-
tionships” is to indicate that nothing whatsoever exists prior to such “relationships.”
Watsuji’s target here is obviously the ﬁrst-person “individual,” and in particular, the
self presented as a temporal being in Heidegger’s phenomenology, as depicted in
Climate and Culture. Watsuji’s aim seems to be to dismantle this kind of selfhood
through his conception of space. Yet this gives rise to the problem of what the basic
unit is, when we deal with relationships. If Watsuji is to reject taking the individual or
subject as the unit, then there can be only one answer. It is that the “relationship”
itself is the basic ontological unit for Watsuji.
What if, for a moment, we regard the basic unit of “relationship” as an issue of
ﬁrst or second “personhood”? The phenomenon of “relationship” itself seems to de-
mand spatiality, and yet at the same time it seems to be based on a principle of duality.
If that is so, then the “relationship” between You and I will be the basic unit for dis-
coursing about everything. And what corresponds to this “relationship” will be neither
You nor I but the peculiar and pure space constituted by the “two persons.” The place
of this kind of “relationship” can be said to refer to a pure “place-ness” in which the
self and the other are undifferentiated.
If we situate Watsuji within the current of thought of the Kyoto school, which was
heavily inﬂuenced by Nishida, then this immediately calls to mind the discussion of
the “release from solipsism” as pure experience. Yet while Watsuji’s “relationship” is
a kind of pure experience, it is rather a peculiar situation, involving a duality and at
the same time having a solipsistic tinge.
Of course, if we consider the relation between Nishida and Watsuji, the situation
is not so simple. On the one hand, Nishida’s discussion of the release from solipsism
in his Study of Good (1960) is a depiction of the world as pure experience. On the other
hand, while Watsuji’s discussion of two-personhood is in one respect an escape from
solipsism (denial of a closed self), it is directed toward the two-person relationship
(and the two-personhood therein). And the direct, gapless relationship between the
two persons is, in Nishida, akin to pure experience (de-personhood), depicted as the
state of being undifferentiated from the world.
Furthermore, Watsuji develops his discussion in a way that contrasts with that of
Nishida, who thoroughly probes pure experience to the bottom. For Nishida, pure ex-
perience is something that goes vertically down and down in space. Watsuji, however,
presents a situation in which two-level persons are pushed out horizontally. In contrast
to Nishida, who discerns the phase of “nothingness” in vertical depth and develops
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political arguments from this phase, Watsuji constructs society and the state by ex-
panding his discussion of two-personhood to the relationship to the impersonal others.
This is a crucial difference.
Finally, the peculiarity of Watsuji’s theory of two-personhood, when it is conceived
purely as a theory of the Other, is considered. As pointed out earlier, insofar as this kind
of two-personhood functions as the basic unit of pure experience, it is closer in content
to the pure experience of one person, even if it is called two-personhood. Although it
is a “relationship,” it is a relation with a “gapless Other,” so to speak. consider how
other commonsensical theories of the Other start from the unintelligibility or alien-
ness of the Other, we can see that Watsuji’s theory is a little bizarre. considering the
place of this discussion in Watsuji’s overall philosophy, it does not seem valid to simply
say that this is a self-justiﬁcatory account of the un-modernistic worldview of the
Japanese (and of Japanese society), where the self and other are undifferentiated.
(Normally, this kind of relationship would be depicted through the relationship between
mother and child. However, Watsuji does not have the mother-child relationship in
mind at all; the relationship that Watsuji is discussing is the sexual relationship between
an adult male and female.) Watsuji is concerned not with two opposed persons, but
with pure experience, where everything is uniﬁed in the betweenness with Other. And
he is taking this up not as a mother-child relationship, nor as a relationship of depend-
ence, but as a systematic principle of “two-personhood.”
since this two-person relationship is the basic unit of the community, the two per-
sons are at the same time self-sufﬁcient. Thus, to intentionally distort the meaning of
terms, these two persons can be said to be a solipsistic two-personhood.
With the aforementioned in mind, this article now examines the pure-experiential
“relationship-ness” of Watsuji’s theory of two-personhood, a two-personhood that
seems even solipsistic.
The presupposition of Watsuji’s theory of 
the two-person community
How does Watsuji depict his theory of the two-person community? To consider this,
it is necessary to examine the context in which this discussion occurs. The core of
Watsuji’s claim is that there are two kinds of “relationships.” These are the “between-
ness” of the self and other, and the “betweenness” of the self and environment. This
claim, which is also repeated in Culture and Climate and at the outset of Ethics, presents
the issue of spatiality in contrast with temporality and prescribes in a direct way what
a “relationship” is.
As is well known, this is basically a criticism of Heidegger’s depreciation of “spa-
tiality” in his analysis of Dasein, arguing for the introduction of a spatial principle into
the foundation of the subject’s existence. However, what we must ask is what
Heidegger (and Husserl) wanted to claim by situating time at the centre of their dis-
cussion. Thinking from this direction, insofar as discussions situating temporality at
their centre were unable to let go of the self or selfhood as ﬁrst-person-ness, we can
see that a critique of the temporal self leads to the question: is the self really something
ﬁrst-personal?
Let us retrace Watsuji’s argument in Climate and Culture. For instance, Watsuji ex-
plains the phenomenon of coldness, using Heideggerian terms such as existence/ec-
stasy/ex-sistere. Watsuji rejects the assumption of a differentiation between subject
and object. He insisted that coldness is something existing objectively and that the
self feels it only accidentally and the idea that coldness exists only as a subjective sen-
sation. coldness is neither an objective existence nor a psychological phenomenon.
To feel coldness is to directly live coldness in a spatial place and to form the self in that
place. building on Heidegger, Watsuji writes:
When we say that we feel cold, we ourselves are already dwelling in the
outside cold. To say that we ourselves come into relation with coldness
means nothing other than that we ourselves are out in the cold. (Watsuji
2010, p. 12, emphasis in original)
Thus, when we feel cold we discover ourselves in coldness itself … When
we ﬁrst discover the coldness, we ourselves are already out in the cold … to
‘go outside’ is a fundamental principle of our own structure, and our inten-
tionality is also based on this. (Watsuji, 2010, p. 13, emphasis in original)
In Heideggerian terminology, this can be said to be a rephrasing of Nishida’s idea
of pure experience, where the subject and object are undifferentiated. It is not within
the domain of the subjective that the self is the self. The self is so structured that it is
from the outset outside of itself, and there it rediscovers that there is a self. Yet this dif-
fers from Heidegger’s account in that the structure of “going outside” itself is strongly
related with the place-ness of the “climate and culture,” and in that it employs the no-
tion of “relationship” as a framework for understanding this structure in a concrete
way. If coldness is neither an objective existence nor a subjective feeling, then what
exactly is it? It must be something embodying a manifold of relationships.
In the ﬁrst place, coldness itself is something that can only be discerned within
the “relationship” called “us.” If the coldness is something that goes beyond the realm
of the self, then it is from the outset a communal existence. There, the “us” is exposed
as something that precedes the self. This is also in accord with Nishida, for whom pure
experience, in which the subject and object are undifferentiated, is not something
solipsistic, but is a domain that exists prior to the domain of the solipsistic.
Furthermore, Watsuji (2010) makes it clear that the “us” is in relation with other
phenomena enveloping coldness, such as “warmth and hotness,” “wind, rain, snow
and sunshine.” We may in general be able to call this “climate.” but this kind of “cli-
mate” can only exist in relation with the 
soil quality, terrain and landscape of a certain region. Just as we discover
ourselves in joy or in pain within the wind scattering ﬂowers, so we dis-
cover ourselves losing vigour in the sun shining directly on the trees during
a drought. (p. 15)
It is as if Watsuji, borrowing Heidegger’s scheme, is trying to indicate pure expe-
rience, as discussed by Nishida, within its various bifurcative modes. While depicting
the experience where the subject and object are undifferentiated as something that
precedes all concrete experience, Nishida deepened his theory in the direction of the
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“nothing” at the vertical “base,” using the logic of the “self-limitation” called “aware-
ness.” Watsuji, however, although inﬂuenced by Nishida, articulates pure experience
into the double-layered complex of relationships called the self and other, the self and
the land. In contrast with Nishida, whose theory of pure experience has a mystic dy-
namism of going toward the “place of nothingness” through limitation and deepening,
Watsuj’s theory clearly traces pure experience horizontally (spatially) in its level artic-
ulateness.
returning to the article’s introduction, we can see that Watsuji’s discussion is ul-
timately a clear criticism of Heidegger. Heidegger himself does not depict a vertical or
horizontal expansion of the spatiality of pure experience. This is why Watsuji (2010)
writes: “A temporality not based on spatiality is not yet a true temporality. The reason
why Heidegger remained in this kind of temporality is because his Dasein is nothing
but an individual” (p. 4).
Although Watsuji does not go into details here, the notion of bringing the self
back to its origin was signiﬁcant for Heidegger’s ontological project. Here, the concept
of “affection” or “self-affection,” employed frequently in phenomenology, plays an im-
portant role in the structure in which the self relates to itself. However, for Watsuji and
Nishida, who escape the scheme of temporality, what is important is the limitations
and bifurcations in space. This is natural, insofar as Watsuji, in contrast to Heidegger,
for whom existence was “nothing but an individual,” emphasized inter-personality
and climate and culture via the spatiality of “relationships.”
The rarefication of first-personhood
summarizing our discussion so far, Watsuji describes the self, either in Climate and
Culture or in Ethics. Here, he is trying to grasp in a broad and concrete way a Nishida-
like place-ness, where the subject and object are undifferentiated, in contradistinction
to an individual in the Heideggerian sense. What, then, will happen to that which can
only be described as individual?
Watsuji discusses this kind of ﬁrst-personhood in chapter 3 of Ethics, entitled
“Organisations of Human relations.” He expands his discussion from the private to
the public, from the family to the local community. Although his discussion is centred
on the notion of “family,” the expansion proceeds from the two-person community
to a three-person community, and then to a community of siblings. There, the indi-
vidual corresponding to the Heideggerian Dasein plays only a very limited role.
It is true that Watsuji is examining a private existence. However, for Watsuji the
private, as the word itself indicates, is nothing but a privation, namely a “privation of
the public.” The I is fundamentally a state in which the spatial moment has been re-
duced to a kind of point, and if one tries to grasp this temporally, the only state one
can reach is an isolated subjectivity lacking all connection. And it need hardly be said
that for Watsuji, this kind of isolated spatiotemporal existence is nothing but an ab-
straction, where the public nature of the self, the relationships that are already involved
whenever the self discovers itself, is “abstracted away.” The isolated individual ex-
presses nothing but a “privation” of the public, in this case of the climate-cultural com-
munal existence.
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Watsuji (2007) does not regard the private as an existence in a positive sense. It
has reality only as an abstract term of a “relationship”:
To lose the possibility of participating [in the public] is not to essentially
lose the possibility of participation, but to not desire participation, and to
not be allowed participation. Thus, the privation of the public is essentially
to be rejected public-ness within the public. Herein consists the private
being. There is thus no such thing that absolutely lacks public-ness, that
is, something essentially private. (p. 91, emphasis in original) 
The private is only one branch of the group or relationship, and it cannot subsist by it-
self. Thus, if we follow Watsuji’s argument, insofar as the ﬁrst-person self is something
private, it does not exist.
The self does exist, but it is not something ﬁrst-personal. It is possible to discourse
about the self, but it is only a part of a “relationship.” This is an extremely radical crit-
icism of the ﬁrst-person way of thinking. Nishida, while maintaining the undifferenti-
ated-ness of pure experience as his base, in one respect has an escape route from this
kind of problem, namely the self-limiting method of “awareness.” Watsuji, however,
for whom the private domain is nothing but a privation, cannot admit the existence
of an original, private self, including the Heideggerian being turned toward death.
Yet is it not impossible for the central nucleus that constitutes society to be dis-
persed? Here, it is noteworthy that what Watsuji presents is the two-person community.
The aim of Watsuji’s two-person community argument is to recover something that is
a “relationship” and yet is not quite “public,” but rather something close to the “I,” as
the centre of a world utterly deprived of the “I” or self.
Thus, Watsuji (2007) is able to discuss the other as a “relationship” that is just
barely a “private existence.” He depicts this relationship as “a two-person relation
where the self and other are literally nothing but the self and other, an extremely inti-
mate I-Thou relation because it rejects the participation of every other person” (p. 95).
Here, we can say that the “exceptional other” itself is at stake. This kind of two-per-
sonal other (which Watsuji does not posit as a reality) is the basis upon which the dis-
cussion expands from the ﬁrst-personal to the third-personal.
We, who are trying to trace the steps toward the realisation of communal
existence, can ﬁnd our point of departure just here. It [the two-person
community] is at once a markedly private existence, and yet indicates the
realisation of a markedly communal existence. This is the reason why we
are able to approach the structure of solidarity through the privation of
public-ness. (p. 95, emphasis in original)
For Watsuji, whose emphasis is on the “relationship,” the point of departure is not the
individual. rather, it is a “private” “communal-ness” mode of “relationship.” 
What is the two-person community?
We have seen how Watsuji postulates the two-person community as a basic concept
for laying down an ontology of “relationships.” What kind of two-person-ness is de-
picted by this concept? Here, Watsuji (2007) begins making some rather bizarre claims:
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In an intimate I-Thou relation, the self and other not only accept each
other’s participation into the innermost depth of each other’s existence,
but they also demand such participation, as is expressed in the idiom, re-
veal the ‘bottom of each other’s hearts’. Therefore nothing is hidden be-
tween the self and other. so far as one is capable of awareness, one’s
existence is through and through open to the participation of the other.
(p. 96, emphasis in original)
Thus in the two-person community, the ‘I’ disappears and everything be-
comes public. Yet, it is public only between the two persons; it is not public
at all with respect to any other person. Indeed, it is this secrecy and hidden-
ness from other persons, the understanding that only I participate in You,
that realises ever more strongly the community between two persons.
(pp. 97–98)
Although inevitable, Watsuji’s account here is a bit misleading. This account gives
the impression that the “I” exists prior to the two-person community, and then after-
wards the two-person community arises between two persons. If the account is read
in this way, it will be extremely peculiar. That absolutely nothing should be hidden
between two persons, that everything should be exposed to the other—this is an ex-
tremely bizarre two-person relationship. However, if we understand this intimate two-
person relation as a model of the “I,” something that is hidden in secrecy from the
outside community, something deprived of public-ness, or in other words the funda-
mental form of the “private,” then the account makes sense.
We should also examine the intimacy and secrecy of this kind of two-person-ness
in light of the fact that Watsuji concretely and strongly emphasizes that the two-person
existence is a sexual, bodily existence (he speciﬁcally has in mind the community of
a married couple). While criticizing the evolutionary claim that two-personhood
emerged from the animalistic impulse for sex, Watsuji depicts the bodiliness (sexual
bodiliness) of two persons as constituting the foundation of ethics:
When a man and woman share their existence in love, they participate in
each other with their entire body and soul. They disclose their existence
to each other through and through, leaving nothing that may reject the
other’s participation. However, this mutual participation stoutly rejects
the participation of any third person. (p. 115)
This account also needs some commentary. If one were to read only this, one
would think that Watsuji is discussing a very romantic kind of love in connection with
his theory of two-personhood. Furthermore, if one were to understand this discussion
in terms of “married couples,” it would appear as a display of a very old-fashioned
ethics against adultery or inﬁdelity, and as such it could be criticized as ultimately
being nothing but a discussion relying on extremely patriarchal premises.
However, when Watsuji depicts the sexual I-Thou relation as an epitome of two-
personhood, there is no “hidden” “secret” domain “prior” to the community, where
the two persons reveal themselves to each other through and through. There is ﬁrst
the “relationship,” and if ﬁrst-personhood appears as a privation of this relationship,
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then the self is nothing but that which is discerned as a privation of the two-person
relation.
Is it not a matter of course that this two-personhood seems to be something “pri-
vate?” This can also be seen in the circumstance where the acts of the two persons are
“hidden” spatially. It is precisely in this sense that the relation between two persons is
something that cannot be explained in terms of an animalistic impulse or the evolution
thereof. What is important here is the fact that Watsuji is extracting the archetypal sit-
uation where the two persons completely reveal themselves to each other, but at the
same time it is precisely this two-personhood that is spatially “hidden.”
Insofar as this is so, although Watsuji’s two-person community seems to depict a kind
of limit of the two-person relationship, it is rather a radical concretization of the “relationship”
that Watsuji regards as fundamental. This is also understandable that Watsuji emphasizes
the two-person community as the core of his expansion of the two-person community
into other forms of community, namely the parent-child community, sibling commu-
nity, as well as from the family community to the regional community.
This is an important point. From the standpoint of the standard Japanese way of
thinking, this kind of de-personalised, uniﬁed relationship is usually conceived in the
form of the “parent-child relation.” Many theories of Japanese culture give such a de-
piction. Watsuji, however, presents the intimacy of the married couple or sexual couple
as something different in nature from the parent-child relation. Furthermore, the two-
personhood of the parent and child is not a step toward the genesis of the self.
consider Watsuji’s (2007) concept of the parent-child relation. What is at stake
here is the three-person community formed by the combination of the two-person
community with a child. In this case, the child is not a member of the two-person com-
munity, but is only an external being. Furthermore, even when the discourse is ex-
panded into the three-person community, the centrality of the two-person community
is unaltered:
The three-person community is not a mere addition of a third person to
the two-person community. It is essentially a three-person community, and
its structure is completely different from that of the two-person community.
The two-person community demands within itself a thorough erasure of
the I, and is deﬁned as a strictly closed, private existence with respect to
the outside. … However, in the three-person community, this kind of pri-
vate existence cannot be permitted. (pp. 166–167, emphasis in original) 
The child is depicted as an existence necessary for the social emergence of the
two-person community. Here, it seems that Watsuji is discussing the Aufheben (subla-
tion) of the Hegelian dialectic. For with the expansion of the two-person community
into the three-person community, the “privacy” of the two-personhood is rejected,
and the road is opened toward the public scene (an expansion of the family as a unit).
Yet, for this reason, even in the conglomeration of families, the fundamentality of two-
personhood is unchanged. This can also be seen in the account that Watsuji gives after
his discussion of the sibling community (the complex multi-dimensionalization of
the three-person community), which is a variant of the three-person community
formed by parents.
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While Watsuji (2007) claims that the married couple community is at the core of
the two-person community, parent-child community, and sibling community, he says
that this centrality is not a temporal priority. rather the order is principled and strict:
What we are concerned with is the before and after of the mediation rela-
tion. The father-mother-child community is mediated by the married cou-
ple community, but the married couple community is a community of
sexual being and is not mediated by the father-mother-child community.
To interact as man and woman has nothing essential to do with the child’s
qualiﬁcation as a child. Likewise, the sibling community is mediated by
the father-mother-child community, but the father-mother-child commu-
nity does not need the sibling community in order to subsist. In this sense,
the married couple community, father-mother-child community and sib-
ling community form a unilateral stratiﬁed relation that cannot be arbitrar-
ily inverted. (p. 203, emphasis in original) 
Following this, Watsuji inquires further by taking up the subject of Hegelian mar-
riage and love, as well as cultural anthropological studies of families, such as that of
Durkheim. And even in the stages in which the family becomes something more com-
prehensive, he keeps the married couple community at the centre of the community.
It would be the principle that comes from the idea that the two-person couple is the
model of the betweenness.
This is deeply related to the spatiality of the public and private. Whatever is explic-
itly presented as public has, as an opposite aspect, a hidden, private part. While the fam-
ily community functions as something private with respect to its outside (the spatiality
of the house deﬁnes this function), with respect to the married couple it is public. The
regional community beyond the family also forms a group as something hidden with
respect to its outside (here, geographical borders will initially be a signiﬁcant factor),
but it is itself a public existence. Watsuji depicts this kind of reversed intertwining of in-
side and outside that the public and private display in a sort of hierarchical structure.
It is true that one could criticize Watsuji’s structure of subsumption as having a
kind of nationalistic bias. In examining the range of Watsuji’s Ethics, it is important to
discuss his attitude in this regard. but here I want to consider the opposite direction,
for Watsuji, the innermost private part of the subsumption structure, the most hidden
part which no longer has an inside, is the two-person relation described as the I and
Thou. This can be seen as an Otherness with a bizarre, private nature.
A direct and mediate relationship
This notion can be examined from two points. As mentioned at the outset, the ﬁrst is
Watsuji’s relation to the theme of Nishida’s pure experience and the I and Thou (and
the discussion of the Kyoto school that expands this theme). The second is the devel-
opmental potential of the claim as a theory of the Other.
Watsuji’s relation with Nishida and the Kyoto school can be considered from the
following perspective. For Nishida, the state where there is no distinction between sub-
ject and object, as pure experience, is the foundation of all experience, and the self
arises from this state as a limitation. Watsuji, however, conceives of this emergence of
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the self in terms of a sexual two-person relationship. It is true that Watsuji discusses
the internal, hidden, and secret aspect of two-personhood and does not, like Nishida,
immediately unify pure experience with the world itself. Yet for Watsuji, two-person-
hood is the pure relationship upon which everything else is based. As such, is it not
one form of pure experience where the subject and object are undifferentiated?
What is important, however, is that Nishida inquires into pure experience in its
various forms, weaving into it awareness and place, Absolute Nothingness, along with
the Other and death. When Nishida discusses place-ness, pure experience is no longer
a simple undifferentiated-ness of the self and world, but is, on the one hand, that from
which the self emerges from the world and nothingness by “limitation,” and, on the
other, something that is vertically probed into, toward the depths of “Absolute
Nothingness,” all the while containing within itself multiple vertical aspects. After his
“Absolute Nothingness” period, Nishida introduces the moments of negativity such
as Otherness and death as moments of self-limitation and weaves these into his theory
of the self and other. However, Nishida’s theory of the Other in his Self-aware Limitation
of Nothingness is characterized by a mutuality in which the self and other are both
within the same (nothingness of the) world, and yet within that (nothingness of the)
world, they each discover their own “bottom.” Thus at this stage, there is no difference
in that the self is related with the world, and that the Other emerges from there.
Nishida therefore presents the Other as a concept that (like death and eternity) con-
tributes to a kind of horizontalization of Absolute Nothingness.2 The bodily moment
should therefore have some bearing here, but Nishida does not explore this aspect (at
least at this stage, before he goes into his theory of poiesis).
For Watsuji, in contrast, there is ﬁrst neither the self nor the world, but the undif-
ferentiated-ness of the self and other (the two-person world), with its spatial arrange-
ment of relationship-ness, and it is from this spatiality that all order emerges. Thus, even
though this undifferentiated-ness is a domain prior to the self, it is always a “relation-
ship” with an Other, whose spatial moment is concretized as “climate and culture,”
“environment,” and “land.”
For Nishida the task was to extract the domain of the self as a limitation of pure
experience. Whereas for Watsuji, the pure experience of “relationship” remains a two-
person relation, and this two-personhood spatially expands outwards by forming hi-
erarchically a nexus of mutual reversals of the private and public. The private is nothing
but a privation. For this reason, Watsuji does not emphasize the “limitation” discussed
by Nishida. rather, he shows interest in the multi-layered, spatially inﬁnite expansion
of “relationships,” as well as in the technological and cultural objects produced by this
expansion. He therefore does not take up Nishida’s vertical deepening or the self-for-
mation of the self for which the deepening functions as a springboard. both Watsuji
and Nishida deal with the same place-ness of pure experience, but Watsuji’s place-
ness is from the outset markedly horizontal, in stark contrast to Nishida, who, in his
discussion of place, frequently employs the word “bottom.”
Self/Otherness as intensional space 
retracing the peculiarity of Watsuji’s discussion of the I and Thou, what we see is an
almost careless conjugation of a theory of the self and other, necessary for the comple-
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tion of the self’s relationship-ness, with a much too grotesque depiction of the direct-
ness of the self and other that displays in full the sexual body. The peculiarity of
Watsuji’s argument lies in the way in which he so easily connects the theoretical on
the one hand with the concrete on the other.
This peculiarity stands out if we compare Watsuji’s theory with other forms of the
theory of the Other. consider Emmanuel Levinas: he developed ideas about the
Otherness of the Other that can be said to be extreme, exposing the Otherness within
the absolute absence of relationship. Watsuji’s discussion is the direct opposite of this.
For Levinas, the Other was something that cannot be reached no matter what (see
Levinas, Totality and Inﬁnity, 1969). What is at stake for Watsuji, however, is the gapless
“relationship” with the Other itself. Yet there is a similarity between the theories of
Levinas and Watsuji in that for both, the absoluteness of the relation with the Other
precedes the self. This is related to the fact that after his discussion of the gap from
the absolute Other—an Other called the “face”—Levinas begins speaking of the erotic
physical relationship as the fundamental aspect of the relation with the Other. Yet,
thought simply, it is a marked fact that in contrast to Levinas, who thoroughly inves-
tigates the “Otherness” of the Other, Watsuji presents his theory of the Other in the
form of “not me,” on the basis of the directness of the body.
This is related to the fact that Watsuji was a philosopher of persona. The body
that Watsuji discusses has its characteristic, in one respect, in his theory of the persona
as face/mask, but at the same time, the body for Watsuji is not something that merely
contributes to the intelligibility (or unintelligibility) of the face and its expressions.3
The face is saturated, as by a “shadow,” by the animalistic body, as well as the climate-
cultural territorial-ness of such a body (insofar as the face is a mask, it is always an il-
lusion). The directness and nakedness of sexual relations can be said to be the
“relationship-ness” itself of such a bare body. The persona/face/personality cannot be
depicted except as based upon this kind of intimate and immediate two-personhood.
The distance-less Other to whom nothing is hidden—here is a world prior to the
self. To repeat, this kind of Other is not a uniﬁcation with the mother or the undiffer-
entiated consciousness of the baby that is often presupposed in theories of Japanese
culture. There would be no symmetrical branching off of the horizontality of person-
hood in such a relation. The child is strictly precluded from the two-person community.
The two-person community itself comprises the contradiction of being at once a direct
community of the sexual bodies and the most fundamental mediation. For the pri-
mordial bodily relationship of the married couple, the child is nothing but a third-per-
sonal existence; the two-person community excluding the child is in principle (not
temporally) prior. This self-other relation is not a conﬁnement into oneself as exem-
pliﬁed by the mother-child relation, but is at once a completely private internal-ness
and a completely public external-ness.
simply put, it is an internality with nothing private and a between-ness that is
closed off, but not an individual’s closed-off-ness. It is a space such that it is a relation-
ship but not yet a public relation, and although it lacks a term for forming a relation-
ship, it is itself half closed. From a commonsensical perspective, this spatiality is bizarre.
However, if we look beyond this bizarreness a bit, this discussion of between-ness
466 Canadian Journal of Communication, Vol 41 (3)
seems to depict the coexistence and ambiguity of the two mutually contradictory ele-
ments of “distance” and “relation” that between-ness embodies, without reducing it
into a mere opposition. It is not a merely extensional spatiality, but a spatiality that is
pregnant with a heterogeneous intensity, which, at the same time, markedly displays
a kind of fundamental non-self-ness and non-opposition-ness.
A mode of space that has an intensity, but does not expand this into a contradic-
tion—this kind of spatiality is something that can be concretized, not only in the as-
pects of principle, but also in the cultural aspects variously described by Watsuji
himself as a history of ideas. It is true that Watsuji tended to describe this in the context
of Japan, in particular in the context of cultural history. Yet I believe that retracing his
account in detail will, despite the fact that Japan is Watsuji’s intellectual backdrop,
serve as a case study for a theory of space in general.
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Notes
Part of this article was ﬁrst published in Japanese in Nihon Tetugaku Genron Josetsu (Introduction to1.
Elements of Japanese Philosophy), especially chapter 4. but I have modiﬁed many paragraphs for this
article. 
In addition to the Other, Nishida discusses death (life involving death) and eternity (the eternal2.
now) as paradoxical phenomena involving the transformation of a vertical limit into something hori-
zontal. The Other is, in the same sense, a moment of negation introduced into negation-less pure ex-
perience.
see Watsuji (1963). It is true that Watsuji discusses the peculiarity of the face within the body by3.
employing the concept of “mask,” but at the same time he writes that the “mask” is something that
moves. This indicates that the “mask” itself is predicated upon the body, which is its background
“shadow,” and its dynamic relations. At the same time, as in his account in Ethics (1934), Watsuji sug-
gests that the “mask” leads, through the persona (personality), to the social totality. In this sense, for
Watsuji the face is not so much the manifestation of a direct Otherness as it is an empty mask, a me-
diation, as indicated by the fact that it is epitomized by the Noh mask.
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